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Swedish Black Earth: The trials and tribulations of the publicly listed, 
investor-led, Western farming model in Russia and Ukraine 
 
Brian Kuns, Oane Visser and Anders Wästfelt 
 
Introduction and Aims 
Super large-scale Nordic owned and run farms in Russia and Ukraine began operations in 2006 
and 2007 with much fanfare. Their goal – other than to earn high returns of course – was to 
‘revolutionize agriculture’ (Lundin 2008) in post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine. They would, in the 
words of Black Earth Farming, ‘unlock the potential of Russian agriculture.’ (Black Earth 
Farming 2009, 4). These six words look both to the future and the past at the same time. What 
they suggest is that only now – when it is possible to tap the deep pockets of western investors 
via stock exchanges and deploy international best practice agronomy with western machines and 
management – will agricultural production increase and become more efficient in the former 
Soviet Union. The Nordic companies are part of a larger trend of the growth of domestic and 
foreign agroholdings1 in Russia and Ukraine (Walther 2014; Visser and Spoor 2011), and these 
super large corporate farms can be seen as a vanguard of well-financed and hyped foreign 
investors. In contrast to the high initial expectations, the results of these Nordic agroholdings, 
both in terms of agricultural performance and profitability, continue to disappoint (although with 
considerable variation among them).  
 
The main question to be addressed in this paper is: why have these investments, begun with 
much optimism, not been successful? We will locate the reasons for this current lack of success 
in (1) the  mixed role that finance has played in the development of these companies, and (2) an 
initial failure on the part of investors to appreciate the unique climatic and other local challenges 
presented by agriculture (compared to other economic endeavours), even when sophisticated 
equipment and global best agronomy practices are implemented. Access to finance 
is usually seen as one of the primary advantages for large-scale agriculture, but we will detail 
how the preferences and pressures emanating from investors have resulted in a number of 
unintended consequences that have in some cases negatively impacted both corporate and 
agricultural performance. Likewise the use and deployment of top-of-the-line western farm 
machinery and international best practice agronomy were also seen as crucial advantages for 
                                                          
1 ‘Agriholdings are farming companies that are made up of multiple operations under a more or less centralized 
management. In literature, the terms agroholding and agroholding are used synonymously. ... There is wide 
agreement that agroholdings have a head company that controls a number of other companies... Some authors 
include as part of their definition that agriholdings are projects of companies who have their core business outside 
primary agriculture. Some, while not making it a defining criterion, point out that that this is often the case.’ 
(Walther 2014, 5).  
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these investments, and yet agricultural performance has (with the possible exception of 2014) 
also been a disappointment. We will look at the discourse and ideas behind the production 
optimism and relate this to the adapting practice in the fields.  
 
More broadly, we seek to critically examine and contextualize claims concerning the degree to 
which super large corporate farms financed by stock market capital do indeed achieve superior 
agricultural performance. Some (Balman et al 2013) argue that the agroholdings are finally now 
starting to arrive at this promised superior performance, while others have not found evidence for 
increasing returns to scale in Ukrainian agriculture (Deininger, Nizalov, and Singh 2013, Lerman 
et al 2007). While studies of mega corporate farms from other parts of the world do wonder if, as 
Chaddad (2014, 580), who studied publicly traded BrasilAgro, puts it, ‘these experiments in 
corporate style agriculture… will survive’, the general tone is not pessimistic (For a Canadian 
perspective, see Magnan 2012). The Nordic companies studied here, over seven years after their 
start (which is often the maximum period for financial investments by private equity) still show a 
performance that is clearly below expectations. The one possible exception to this tendency is, as 
detailed below, the exception that proves the rule. Based on an in-depth examination of the 
Nordic agroholdings, we arrive at an assessment of super large corporate farms that points to 
major contradictions and risks.   
 
Farmland, Scale and Finance: a Review   
This article addresses two recent trends which, although closely interrelated, involve quite 
separate theoretical debates: namely, the emergence and performance of super large corporate  
farms (a theoretical issue of scale) and, secondly, the emergence and performance of farm 
companies listed on stock exchanges (an issue of financialization of agriculture, and shareholder 
value in particular). Though this article will touch on the first issue, the focus here will be on the 
latter. ‘Finance’ here refers mostly to private and institutional investors, and in particular stock 
market investors, but in this paper it is also shorthand, following Epstein (2005, 3), for when 
financial motives – such as boosting shareholder value – become relatively more important in 
determining corporate strategy in non-financial sectors (like agriculture).  
 
Why Farms Want Financial Investment 
Proponents of finance in agriculture see finance helping farming in two main ways. First, finance 
is seen as helping companies achieve a large scale of production, where it is argued there are 
economies of scale, i.e. that total factor productivity will rise above and beyond the increase in 
factors of production (See for example Black Earth Farming 2008, 6, 17; Alpcot Agro 2010a, 
16). Beyond economies of scale of production, a large-size helps farms achieve so-called 
external economies of scale (Johnson and Ruttan 1993, 693). In other words, large farms have 
more negotiating heft with input suppliers, on the one hand, and grain traders on the other, 
allowing them to reduce cost and capture a greater share of the revenue stream in their own 
profits. This was something also cited by interviewees in this study. External economies of scale, 
it is argued, can be particularly important in markets or economies where institutions actually 
undermine economic activity (Rylko and Jolly 2005; Koestler 2005; Deininger and Byerlee 
2012; Walther 2014).2 Horizontal and/or vertical integration within large companies can 
                                                          
2 Indeed Koestler (2005) essentially argues that external economies of scale in relation to local and national 
governments is the key advantage of large agroholdings in the former Soviet Union. It is harder, in other words, for 
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similarly help companies overcome market imperfections and/or a lack of infrastructure 
(Deininger and Byerlee 2012; Walther 2014). Second, beyond helping negotiate down the price 
of inputs, finance helps farms afford increasingly expensive and sophisticated inputs, capital and 
otherwise, to agriculture (Deininger and Byerlee 2012, Deininger, Nizalov, and Singh 2013; 
Magnan 2012). These new technologies, it is argued, can help large-scale agriculture overcome 
what are seen as some of its traditional disadvantages with respect to monitoring and transaction 
costs (Deininger and Byerlee 2012).  
  
What Financial Investors See in Farms 
In other to understand the finance aspect of the farm-finance relationship, it is important to take 
into account structural changes in the global economy that have ushered in what is called the 
third global food regime (McMichael 2012). Until recently, agriculture did  not get much private 
financial investment, as agriculture was seen as far too risky. Several regulatory and market 
trends have spurred the recent (closer) connection between agriculture and private finance 
(Martin and Clapp 2015 forthcoming) since the early 2000s.  
 
 First, the global surge of food prices (and in the slipstream farmland prices) has changed 
the (perceived) risk profile of agricultural investment. Higher food and farmland prices 
harbour the promise that the traditional risks associated with climate-related volatility, for 
instance, can be compensated with higher margins. Also, as food and farmland prices 
were increasing, traditional equities and bonds – in the run-up to and during the global 
financial crisis – were seen to be becoming less reliable, and thus investors turned to 
farmland to diversify investments (Buxton, Campanale and Cotula 2012). 
 Second, in many parts of the world there has been a decline in state finance for 
agriculture, usually within the framework of structural adjustment or market transition 
programmes in developing and post-socialist countries. Farming in these countries has, as 
a result, become more dependent on private finance (Martin and Clapp 2015 
forthcoming). Since banks often find lending to agriculture producers (except for the 
super large ones) too risky without state guarantees and subsidies (ibid), novel financing 
schemes for agriculture such as stock exchange listings and bonds have emerged. 
 Third, regulatory changes, championed by international development institutions, have 
taken place over the past decade (and are still ongoing), that enable external investors to 
enter farming with less transaction costs and risk (Martin and Clapp 2015 forthcoming). 
For example, the World Bank and International Finance Corporation, in facilitating the 
implementation of land titling and registration programs, have made farmland operations 
more transparent and less risky in emerging economies (and in particular in post-socialist 
countries). International agencies have also worked in other ways to diminish the risks for 
investors. For instance, investment treaties have been promoted and signed and state 
guarantees and insurance for investors have been extended to the agricultural sector by 
states and state-funded agencies like the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the World Bank (See Borodina 2014).  
 
                                                          
corrupt officials to seek rents from or otherwise disrupt the work of large agroholdings compared to smaller 
operations. 
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On the back of these structural shifts, farmland, which had traditionally been seen by investors as 
a ‘store of value’ or an inflation hedge in unstable times (Fairbairn 2014; see also Luyt  et al 
2013, 18), is now increasingly viewed as a lucrative ‘asset play’, i.e. a source of capital gains if 
the investment is timed right in terms of economic cycles or policy changes (such as land titling 
and registration) that might drive up land values (Russi 2013, 82; Fairbairn 2014). Also, (some) 
investors have come to see farmland both as a potential capital gain and, especially with rising 
food prices, as a productive asset. Investors in other words also see possibilities to earn returns 
off the cash flow generated by the asset (Fairbairn 2014; Grene 2014). This is sometimes called a 
‘yield-play’, which refers more specifically to when investors see an opportunity to raise yields 
from regional or historical averages. The interplay of asset play and yield play strategies are 
central elements in understanding the actions and results of the Nordic companies. These will be 
discussed extensively in the following sections.  
 
Despite these changes, farmland normally still entails major risks for investors in terms of its 
liquidity – ‘the time it takes to sell an asset and still receive full market value (Kluger and 
Stephan 1997, 19) and transparency (see TIAA-CREF 2013b, 8; Luyt 2013, 32). Traditionally of 
course farmland is illiquid – selling a farm takes time. Investors however want to be able to sell 
off assets fast in response to changing conditions, particularly if the asset has become 
unprofitable. As quoted in an article about European pension fund investments in farmland in the 
Pensions and Investment newsletter (Carter 2010), ‘Before anyone invests now [in farmland], 
they want to know how to exit…. It’s the first thing they want to know.’  
 
Making agricultural investments liquid and transparent, then, are the key challenges in trying to 
attract investors and thereby raise capital on financial markets. The solution to this challenge 
pursued by the companies under review for this paper was a stock market listing. ‘All listed 
shares should be more liquid than those that are not listed, all else being equal’ (Luyt et al 2013, 
52), and, moreover, the size of a publicly listed company, as measured in market capitalization, 
and the number of shareholders, are highly correlated with greater liquidity (Kluger and Stephan 
1997, 20; Bhide 1991, 33). Publicly traded companies additionally have the benefit – from the 
investor point of view – of greater transparency, since public companies regularly have to 
disclose information about the company’s operations and finances.  
 
The Consequences of Financial Investment in Agriculture 
After this review of the case for financial investment in agriculture, and some of its background, 
we now turn to some of the contradictions and potential negative effects. The critical literature 
on ‘farmland investment’ (or ‘land grab’) has mostly focused on the socio-economic 
consequences for rural communities and the environmental impacts. An area that has not been 
sufficiently examined is the way in which finance affects the performance, agricultural and 
otherwise, of the farm companies invested in. Indeed ‘we are only beginning to understand the 
mechanisms and implications’ (Visser, Clapp and Isakson 2015 forthcoming ) of investment in 
farmland and food.  
 
Despite the early stage of research on the topic, some tentative insights on the consequences of 
the entrance of finance in agriculture for farming operations can be sketched.   
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 First, various authors have argued that financialization, or more concretely the entrance 
of investors from the financial sector in another sector, tends to result in a prioritization 
of  speculative strategies over production-oriented strategies. Within agrarian studies, 
financialization has been investigated predominantly with regard to commodity 
exchanges. Many authors have argued that the growing presence of financial actors on 
food commodity exchanges (such as the Chicago Board of Trade) have brought about a 
shift towards speculative instead of production-based hedging (Breger-Bush 2012; Russi 
2013). Based on those findings, one might suspect that such a tendency can also be found 
with regard to the connection between stock exchanges and agriculture, which this article 
examines. However, practically no research has been conducted on this connection, 
probably because the emergence of listed agricultural companies is such a novel 
phenomenon. Especially in developing countries with low land prices, strong speculative 
trends, might create a strata of investors which do not cultivate land, with negative 
consequences in terms of land access for (young) local farmers, and local food security.  
  
 Second, financialisation tends to go hand in hand with a shift to more short-termism, of 
which speculative behaviour could be seen as just one aspect (see for instance Visser and 
Kalb 2010). Private equity funds, and listed companies tend to have a much shorter time 
horizon than for instance large family owned companies (Daniel 2012). A short-time 
investment horizon, tends to deliver higher shareholder value in the short term, at the cost 
of for instance investment in R&D which is important for the long term viability of an 
enterprise.  Meanwhile, agriculture is a sector which traditionally has a very pronounced 
long-term horizon.  
 
 Third, while investors often entered farmland in search of a ‘safe investment’ in times of 
uncertain and volatile equity prices, growing involvement of the financial sector in 
agriculture, might in fact make the latter, which is already volatile due to the weather and 
fluctuating commodity prices, even more uncertain and volatile (Fairbairn 2014). The 
increased risks due to such volatility might subsequently inhibit other investors, who are 
primarily interested in productive (yield play) strategies. 
 
 Fourth, financialization results in the ‘sweeping’ industrialization of agriculture 
(Fairbairn 2014), according to what James C. Scott (1998) would call the ‘catechism of 
high modernist agriculture’. Elements of this discourse include, among other things, ‘the 
superior technical efficiency of large farms’ and industrialized farming’s ability to create 
a ‘uniform’, manipulable environment where local ecological and climate risks can be 
handled  (Scott  1998, 271-272). In the post-Soviet case, it is important to note that, 
instead of a shift to industrialization, there has been a recommitment to the catechism of 
high modernist agriculture, albeit under different forms, and the question is if the same 
criticism applied to Soviet agriculture – that in its modernist and centralist fervour it 
failed to take into account local climatological and ecological circumstances (Ioffe and 
Nefedova 1997) – can (ironically) be directed at the capitalist agroholdings?  
 
 A fifth consequence of financialization is related to the fourth, and involves a growing 
distance between consumers and producers, both in that ‘more decision points are added 
from production to consumption’ and because ‘distancing [encourages] a greater 
7 
 
abstraction of agricultural commodities from their physical form’ (Clapp 2014, 4). Clapp 
looks primarily at the relationship or distance between producers and consumers, arguing 
that this distancing has made it more difficult to mobilize resistance to the current global 
food regime. In this paper, however, we look at the relationship between investors and 
the farms they are investing in. However, in a sense, investors are also consumers, in that 
they purchase a product, ownership shares in these farms, after a sales pitch has been 
made. Just as one can ask with respect to consumers, the question is if investors know 
what they are buying?  
 
 
Below, we will examine the Nordic agroholdings in light of these emerging consequences of 
financialization of agriculture.  
 
Background and Method 
The main companies to be examined here are: Black Earth Farming (BEF), Agrokultura 
(previously Alpcot Agro), Trigon Agri and Grain Alliance AB.3 The first three are listed on the 
Stockholm OMX Nasdaq Stock Exchange, while Grain Alliance has the stated ambition of an 
IPO (‘Initial Public Offering’), and, importantly, publishes regular, interim financial statements, 
operational reviews and annual reports. The three listed companies mentioned above are among 
the top four foreign farm investors in Russia; the other being German Ekoniva, which is not 
listed (Visser, Spoor and Mamonova 2014). Being part of this foreign ‘vanguard’ is one reason 
these companies are interesting. The fact that they are publicly traded is also interesting from a 
research perspective – being listed requires a level of transparency with which private actors do 
not have to comply.  
Table 1 around here 
 
A third reason these companies are interesting is that their business model reflects an emphasis 
on ‘pure-play’ (Luyt et al 2013, XV) or ‘broad-acre’ (Byerlee et al 2012) agricultural production. 
These companies focus mostly on arable crop production and are not examples of vertically 
integrated companies that receive significant revenues from value-added lines of production such 
as: dairy or meat production; sugar, vegetable oil or other food processing; or grain trading (as 
for example Kernel, Astarta or MHP).4 There are today seven such pure-play agroholdings in 
Ukraine and Russia that are also public companies (See Table 1). Of the seven public companies 
in Table 1, one other – Agrogeneration – is primarily foreign. The other four are Ukrainian 
owned companies where only a minority of shares in the company are traded on a stock 
exchange. While there have been critical studies and overviews of post-Soviet agroholdings 
before (Visser and Spoor 2011; Visser, Spoor and Mamonova 2014; Luyt et al 2013), the 
dynamism of the sector underscores the importance of continued study of large-scale farming in 
Russia and Ukraine.  
                                                          
3 One of the authors of this study owns a small amount of shares in each of the publicly traded Nordic companies. 
4 Here Trigon Agri is an exception, as they have dairy operations in Estonia and outside St. Petersburg in Russia. 
They are in fact Estonia’s largest dairy producer. That being said, Trigon has repeatedly indicated that dairy is not a 
core business activity and they have been looking to spin-off or sell their dairy operations for quite some time. 
Trigon also owns a Grain Trading operation in Ukraine, though they are trading less and less third party grain. 
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Another important point is that each of the companies under review here represents an example 
of ‘investor-led farming’, a form of farming which has quickly expanded beyond the West in the 
last decade. Investor-led farming  can be defined as when investors, whose main experience is in 
non-agricultural sectors5, particularly but not limited to other ‘real’ sectors such as commercial 
real-estate, mining and oil, or forestry, are active direct investors in (i.e. play a leading role in the 
management of) and/or literally create farming operations under the assumption that access to 
capital from financial markets plus the deployment of international best practice agronomy and 
top of the line machinery will ensure good financial returns (cf McMichael 2012, 690). Such 
investors include Vostok Nafta and Kinnevik, two of the principal early shareholders of BEF 
who are themselves stock-listed but dominated in each case by a family6, Trigon Capital, the 
founder of Trigon Agri, and Alpcot Capital Management, the founder of Agrokultura.7 Claesson 
Fastigheter AB, a private Swedish real-estate company that purchased a controlling share of 
Grain Alliance AB in 2008, does not play as active a role in the management of the farm as the 
main owners of the three publicly traded firms, but they do help set the overall direction and 
strategy of the firm. The motivations and assumptions of such actors are also important for this 
analysis.   
The sources used for this study are corporate documents (annual and quarterly reports and 
prospectuses and company descriptions before stock emissions and bond solicitations) and 
newspaper coverage of these companies and investors in the Swedish, Russian and English 
language business press. We have also conducted thirteen semi-structured interviews with both 
current and former managers of the Nordic companies and with investors in these companies. 
The interviews were semi-structured to allow reflection on the part of respondents concerning 
why the companies have thus far not been as successful as hoped – something which virtually all 
respondents readily did. Finally, the authors, either separately or together, have attended a total 
of eight shareholder meetings, and listened to or read transcripts of numerous quarterly results 
presentations made by the companies.8  
 
A presentation of the empirical material follows, in which investor preferences and assumptions 
are detailed,. How these views have collided with on-the-ground realities are evaluated, and 
some of the lessons-learned on the part of the companies and investors are presented. In the 
                                                          
5 Trigon Capital, founder of Trigon Agri, and Kinnevik, main shareholder in BEF, did have prior experience with 
farming. Trigon Capital invested in agriculture in the early 2000s in the Baltic countries before branching out into 
Ukraine and Russia, while the Kinnevik concern started in the 1930s with a farm and sugar factory, both of which 
stayed in the concern’s ownership portfolio until the 2000s. However, Kinnevik’s agriculturally related investments 
– now restricted only to BEF – are, and for a long time have been, a minor portion of the overall portfolio, which is 
today focused on media, telecoms and internet commerce. Trigon Agri being one of their larger investments and 
having invested agriculture for over 10 years, Trigon Capital can make a more credible case to being specialized in 
agriculture, though they are in essence a  fund and portfolio manager. The larger point is that these are all financial 
investment firms, whose investments in Russian and Ukrainian agriculture, represent either a branching out into a 
new sector (agriculture) or a significant expansion into the agricultural sector.     
6 The dominant owner in the Kinnevik concern is the Stenbeck family, while Vostok Nafta was founded by the 
Lundin family, whose other interests include Lundin Petroleum. 
7 In each of these three cases, these companies’ top managers were or are actually provided through a so-called 
management agreement between the main owner and the company. Thus KinnAgri, an agricultural consultancy that 
until the beginning of 2015 went into the Kinnevik concern, has a contract with BEF to provide management 
services. Trigon Capital similarly has a contract to provide management services to Trigon Agri, and Alpcot Capital 
Management until 2014 had a management contract to provide management services to Agrokultura.  
8 Only BEF and Trigon Agri hold quarterly results presentations 
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ensuing discussion, a series of contradictions are posited with respect to financial engagement in 
farming and discussed in light of the emerging consequences presented in the theoretical section. 
We conclude with reflections on what the performance of foreign investors says about the whole 
sector, the universality of ‘international best practice’ agronomy, and the mismatch between 
stock market expectations and agriculture.  
 
Investors, Land Speculation and Liquidity 
Investor Preference for Land Speculation 
While the business plans for the public Nordic companies tried to appeal to both views of the 
potential for farmland to generate returns (i.e. as a capital gain and a productive asset), the 
primary interest of the investors in the public Nordic companies was in the possibility of earning 
high returns off the rising value of the land, i.e. an asset play. This relates particularly to Russia, 
where land reform in 2003 allowed the buying and selling of agricultural land, even, thanks to a 
loophole in the legislation, by foreign investors. This is in contrast to Ukraine where a 
moratorium on agricultural land sales has been prolonged on various occasions since the new 
land code was adopted in 2002. In other words, land (in Russia) was seen as under-priced, and, 
in the environment of 2005-2008, when food prices were going up, and against the backdrop of 
rising global population, ‘the case on paper [for making an asset play on Russian agricultural 
land] was very, very good’ (Interview with Stock market analyst, August 2014).  
Archibald Hamilton, an early investor in Agrokultura (then called Alpcot Agro), was quoted in 
the media making the case for an asset play:  
‘I believe it will be a fantastic trip. In Russia, land costs around 3000 SEK (319.15 Euro) 
per hectare, while in Sweden it costs between 50,000 and 60,000 SEK (5319,15 and 
6382.98 Euro) per hectare, but it takes time to get some structure on the land. It [the land] 
has been mismanaged since the 1920s. The big thing is not cereals, but the growth in land 
prices’ (Östlund 2008). 
 
Investors were in fact keen that these companies purchase as much land as possible very fast. As 
a former board member of Agrokultura relates (interview January 2014): ’there was a very big 
interest for this asset class in 2007 and 2008. Even the investors really wanted us to expand very 
fast. In the same vein, a former manager with Agrokultura said the following: 
 
‘… you do not control the financial treadmill (ekorrhjul) yourself. When you have AP-
funds, hedge funds involved, investors from Switzerland, everyone chiming in with 2.2 or 
2.3 billion kr. That is ridiculous money. ... The expectation was: ‘buy land, buy land 
always’. They wanted us to buy land. They gave us money to buy land. Mainly. … They 
really wanted to see the distribution of money in acquired land.’ (Interview with a former 
manager of Agrokultura, November 2014).   
 
Even BEF, whose business plan made a special point of emphasizing the importance of 
production (a ‘yield play’) for an asset-play strategy, was not immune to this pressure to buy 
land. As a former manager with BEF stated ‘...when I met investors up to November 2008, the 
first question I got was [inaudible]: ‘What proportion of your land is registered? [meaning legally 
owned by the company]’’ (Interview with a  former BEF manager, January 2014).’ As the CEO 
of Trigon Agri put it, describing the initial period of the investments in post-Soviet agriculture, 
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‘the whole story [was about] going out there to buy cheap land’. (Notes from Trigon Agri 
General Shareholder Meeting April 2014). 
 
The Nordic companies fulfilled investors preferences for acquiring land, which can be seen in 
Figure 1. This shows the unharvested controlled land (grey) for each of the three publicly traded 
Nordic companies in relation to land under cultivation (black). It was not until 2011 – four or 
five years after beginning operations that the companies cultivated at least half of their holding, 
which is the level of cultivation where Trigon and Agrokultura remain today. While one can 
reasonably make the argument that not much land would be cultivated in an initial build-up 
phase, it is harder to make that argument now seven or eight years after these investments began.   
 
Figure 1 around here 
 
 
Figure 1: Land Bank Dynamics of Publicly Traded Nordic Agroholdings. Agrokultura’s expansion can be described 
as more haphazard or opportunistic than the other two companies, as they expanded both by directly acquiring land 
in Russia and Ukraine, and by taking over so-called ‘distressed assets’. The latter refers to Agrokultura’s takeover of 
Polish PKM’s (Polski Koncern Mięsny Duda) 7,500 ha in western Ukraine, Swedish BBAH’s (Biodiesal Bioethanol 
Agricultural Holding) 16,000 ha in Kaliningrad, and British Landkom’s 79,000 ha spread out throughout Ukraine. 
Trigon started in Ukraine, where they initially cultivated most of the land that they had acquired (by lease), and later 
expanded to Russia, where much of the land remained uncultivated. Trigon has since sought to divest from and 
restructure their Russian holdings. BEF gathered the largest territory, which was, with the exception of a brief foray 
in Samara in eastern Russia, relatively concentrated, and, reflecting their more clearly stated intention of pursuing a 
‘yield-play’ alongside an asset-play, they were relatively fast in terms of bringing a significant portion of their 
holding under cultivation. Land bank totals were compiled from the annual reports of the listed companies.  
 
Liquidity and the Rush to be Publicly Traded 
Though the land was in international terms relatively cheap, large amounts of capital were still 
needed to purchase it. BEF, Trigon Agri and Agrokultura all sought to get that capital via a stock 
market listing, which they achieved relatively fast. Trigon Agri and BEF, founded in 2006 and 
2005 respectively, were first listed in 2007, while Agrokultura, after a delay caused by the 
financial crisis (Thulin 2009) was listed (under the name of Alpcot Agro) in 2009. When asked 
why they were in such a hurry to be listed, BEF chairman of the board Per Brioloth said: ‘The 
possibilities for Russian agricultural land is now. That is why we want to be able to finance 
investments now and not in a half-year or a year’ (Storwall 2007).9  
 
The companies were rather successful in raising capital on the stock markets. In total BEF, 
Trigon Agri and Agrokultura raised 1.2 billion USD, which encompasses pre-IPO stock 
emissions, stock emissions concurrent with or after the IPO and the issuing of Eurobonds, 
convertible instruments, or the taking on of other types of loans. BEF raised the most capital, at 
over $ 600 million, Trigon raised just over $ 300 million, while Agrokultura raised just under $ 
300 million.10 Raising money is important of course, but the purpose of an IPO is also to broaden 
                                                          
9 All were first listed on the Stockholm Exchange’s First North index for small and mid-cap firms, but BEF and 
Trigon Agri later switched to the main index at the Stockholm Exchange, while Agrokultura had plans, later 
scrapped, to switch to the London AIM exchange. 
10 This information is based on own calculations from information compiled from a variety of sources.  Exchange 
rates used to convert from Swedish Kronor (SEK) or Euro to US Dollars are average exchange rates for the year in 
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the ownership base of the company and promote liquidity in the share. (See for example Alpcot 
Agro 2009a, 9; Trigon Agri 2007, p.8). In these terms, the companies have generally been less 
successful. Agrokultura’s shares, for example, tended (before delisting) to be ‘illiquid’, which 
means that, in the words of deputy managing director Hannes Sjöblad, ‘small orders can move 
the market significantly’ (Agrimoney.com 2011a). The number of trades of Trigon Agri’s 
shares11 is roughly at the same level as Agrokultura, while BEF’s shares are more actively 
traded. In the case of all companies the current share-price is far below IPO valuations. Beyond 
the initial success in raising money, the share performance of these companies has, in other 
words, been disappointing.  
 
The liquidity of the stocks is important, since creating conditions for liquid ownership is in fact 
another important reason for pursuing an IPO, particularly as farmland’s traditional illiquidity is 
a reason why investors have shied away from such investments previously. However, liquidity is 
not a problem-free quality in agricultural companies, as indicated by a manager with Grain 
Alliance AB: 
 
‘…Even if our owner had said, we like this asset, something appropriate for family 
investors to have, he still wants to have the possibility to sell this at some point... That 
some big institution is just going to come and buy it... that isn’t so likely. Then let’s see... 
If we at some point want to have liquidity in our ownership, then we have to in any case 
aim for an IPO and therefore you have to just go and try to be big.’ (Interview with a 
manager from Grain Alliance AB, December 2013). 
 
The respondent, as was clear in subsequent discussion in this interview, explained that ‘big’ in 
terms of market capitalization entailed that the company is ‘big’ in terms of the land bank. Luyt 
et al (2013, 20) also report that there is a connection between land bank size and market 
capitalization: ‘initial approaches to valuing farmland companies at IPO in the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine were based on the valuation of the land bank’. Similarly speaking to the 
relationship between larger land bank size and greater liquidity, Agrokultura is quoted in the 
business press as stating that, following the takeover of Landkom in Ukraine, the combined 
company ‘will be an attractive, more liquid vehicle for investors’ (Agrimoney.com 2011b). The 
larger point is that investors see agricultural corporations in Ukraine and Russia through the 
prism of their land banks, even if the company, like Grain Alliance, is less interested in trying to 
make an asset play. IPO valuation and market capitalization, in other words, go hand in hand 
with the size of the land bank, and the bigger the better. 
 
Also, in other respects the desire (or need) to attract external capital (such as loans) brings with it 
the condition of (increasing) size. Ukrainian agroholdings, for example, have found that larger 
landholdings have meant the possibility to secure larger loans, both from the private banks and 
from donor financial institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
                                                          
question. See Black Earth Farming (2014a, 9; 2008 p. 28 appendix; Black Earth Farming 2012b; Alpcot Agro 
(2011b, 17, 31; 2011c; 2010b; 2009c); and Trigon Agri (2008, 4; 2009, 5; 2011c).  
11 Trigon Agri warned in a risk disclosure in 2007 that shares on the First North exchange tend to be illiquid shares 
(Trigon Agri 2007, 28).  
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Development (EBRD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The EBRD and IFC 
have been particularly active in Ukraine over the past five years in support of the largest 
Ukrainian agroholdings (Borodina 2014). Remarking on the role of EBRD and IFC, The Grain 
Alliance manager complained:  
 
‘And they [Kernel, Mryia, UkrLandFarming] have all, they are financed by IFC, EBRD, 
and part of World Bank programs and such like. This is something we have come across, 
I have come across in any case, I have applied for financing, when it was the bad days of 
2008, 2009, to get support from both IFC and EBRD, and they said: ‘you are too small. 
The scale is not good enough. We can’t go in. If we would go in with the money that we 
go in with, then we own half the whole company. We can’t do that. Come back when you 
have become much bigger.’ But it’s maybe not so damn good to be so big.’ (Interview a 
manager from Grain Alliance, December 2013).  
 
Thus, the need to access external finance drives an increase in size up to a magnitude, or at a 
pace, that is not always sensible from a production perspective (see below). 
 
The persistence of investor preferences for land speculation 
The asset play bubble burst almost as soon as it began. BEF’s and Trigon Agri’s share price, 
which had risen considerably at the beginning of 2008 on the back of rising grain prices, took a 
significant dive already in March 2008. While BEF’s share price was considerably higher than 
Trigon’s, the share-price for both companies, as shown below in figure 2, dropped by a similar 
order of magnitude, such that the minimum share price at the end of 2008 was roughly 16% of 
the maximum share value from the spring of the same year. These share price remained at this 
level, even when the rest of the stock market started to recover. Investors have been, needless to 
say, disappointed with the performance of these shares. The companies have shifted emphasis 
and seek to highlight their potential to generate returns off of agricultural production. In the 
words of the stock analyst interviewed as a part of this study ‘…they [the companies] realized 
that they have to deliver a rate of return off of cash flow.’ (interview with Stock market analyst, 
August 2014). That being said it is important to note that more recent share price fluctuations of 
the three publicly listed Nordic companies still reflect asset-play thinking on the part of 
investors. Again the stock analyst:  
 
‘there is a difference between operations and value of the company. And Trigon is the 
company that has delivered the best operational result, but they have not created share-
holder value in the past half-year, while Agrokultura, which has been worst operationally, 
has managed to create shareholder value [by...] showing that they can restructure the 
company and create value in the future... If they just close the company, they can get 6 kr 
per share, [2 kr more per share than the value at the time of the interview.] (Interview 
with stock market analyst, August 2014) 
 
Trigon Agri has in fact complained about this, not in relation to Agrokultura, but in relation to 
BEF: ‘We have half the valuation in certain key-figures compared to BEF, but we have done 
much better than them operationally’ said the Chairman of the Board Joachim Helenius when 
Trigon Agri moved from the First North Exchange to the Main Exchange in Stockholm 
(Svensson 2010). One of the main reasons Trigon Agri’s stock has been discounted compared to 
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BEF’s is that BEF has title to most of their land, while Trigon, because much of its operation is 
in Ukraine, can only rent their land. ‘It is always a risk to improve land that actually belongs to 
someone else and it is difficult for Trigon to create value by selling off land compared to BEF’ 
writes stock market analyst Daniel Svensson (2009; Trifonov 2011 also states that investors first 
look at how secure the ownership of land is in agroholdings).  
 
Figures 2 and 3 around here 
Figure 2: Daily closing share price of BEF and Trigon Agri in 2007 and 2008. The initial drop in the share price in 
March 2008 was caused by the first signs that grain prices, having risen meteorically the previous year, would go 
down (Linstedt 2008, 388-389; see also Voronina 2008). The continued drop in the share price was also affected by 
a statement in July 2008 by the Russian agricultural minister that the Russian government would review how much 
land is owned by foreigners (Linstedt 2008, 389). Additional factors depressing the share-price as the year 
continued, were the brewing global financial crisis and the war in Georgia in August 2008 (This was cited by one 
respondent, but see also Bush 2008 and Hammar 2008 for more on the effect of the Georgian war on foreign 
investment in the Russian economy). The source for share prices is Stockholm Stock Exchange (2014).  
 
Figure 3: Daily closing share price of BEF, Agrokultura, and Trigon Agri in 2013 and 2014 (Stockholm Stock 
Exchange 2014).  
 
More recently, the companies themselves emphasize, when discussing recent divestments of 
parts of their respective land banks, the fact that the share price is undervalued with respect to the 
assets of the company, meaning that buying shares in the company at current prices is a good 
deal. So for example, despite failing to lift production of the Kaliningrad cluster, Agrokultura’s 
divestment of this land in late 2013 was seen as a success by the market, which rewarded 
Agrokultura’s share price with a brief lift. This is because the price that Agrokultura fetched for 
this land, while nominally close to book value, was, according to current Agrokultura CEO 
Stephen Pickup: ‘significantly in excess of the attributed value according to the company’s share 
price…’ (Agrimoney.com 2013a). This is in stark contrast to when Agrokultura announced a 
shift towards more profitable crops in their crop plan, an announcement which actually saw share 
prices fall (Agrimoney.com 2012a). Also revealing latent interest in land speculation, when BEF 
divested from a block of land in Voronezh in 2014, a business journalist noted that if all of 
BEF’s land were to revalued taking into account the sales value of recent divestments in 
Voronezh (in Russia), the substantive value of the shares, around 2 to 2.5 kr per share when the 
article was published, would be closer to 9 kr per share. (Rolander 2014).  
 
In summary, investors prefer land speculation to production, which had a great impact on the 
main orientation of these companies in the early years. The biggest problem related to this asset-
play phase – as will be described below – was the rapid expansion itself, which happened before 
systems had been in place to efficiently cultivate and sell crops.   
 
Agriculture in the former Soviet Union as seen from the Corporate Board Room 
When the bubble burst on land speculation, the other profit generating strategy – agricultural  
production – became more important. The fundamental assumption informing these investments 
is that investment in farming can be done successfully without the need for much agricultural 
expertise on the board. Farming is seen as a ‘real’ investment like any other ‘real’ investment 
such as forestry, mining or commercial real estate. Farmland investment funds seek to promote 
the view that agriculture is just another real investment (see TIAA-CREF 2013a), so this view on 
the part of the investors behind the Nordic agroholdings is in and of itself perhaps not so 
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surprising. Still it is interesting to see how top investors characterized their investment. For 
instance Richard Spinks the founder of Landkom (later bought out by Swedish Agrokultura) 
dismissed the idea that his lack of experience in farming would be a hindrance, saying: ‘It’s just 
like the fish business [in which he worked before], you need to make sure you have professionals 
who can supply the raw material’ (Miller 2008; see also Katz and Robison 2011).12 Michael 
Orlov speaking about making presentations for potential investors in BEF, was quoted by 
Lindstedt (2008, 63) as saying ‘it is scary how superficial the process is when these large 
institutions invest their money’.  
 
Given this view, it is moreover not surprising that the boards of directors of these companies – 
the body that is supposed to represent the owners of the company in relation to the manager – 
contained very few people with agricultural experience. In fact, in the first year of operation for 
the three publicly traded companies not one non-executive board member in any of the 
companies had agricultural experience, as defined by having earlier occupied a management or 
executive position in an agricultural company. Instead, the sector experience of board members 
tended to be concentrated in the real-estate sector, finance and investment, and oil and mining. 
Roughly one-fifth of all board members had had prior experience in Russia and / or spoke 
Russian. Later, BEF and Agrokultura acquired non-executive board members with experience in 
farming, the food industry or grain trading. However, in Agrokultura’s case, there has been a 
great deal of turnover in board membership, as well as top management positions. While none of 
Trigon Agri’s board members had experience with agriculture upon taking a position on the 
board, Trigon has exhibited the most stability in board membership. It is possible that board 
members, particularly those who have been on the board for seven or eight years, have learned 
on the job. 
 
In line with the assumption that agriculture is just like any other real investment, the stock-listing 
prospectuses of the publicly traded companies give short shrift to specific, locally based agro-
ecological risks to the business. To be sure, all of the companies, in virtually identical language, 
state that ‘poor or unexpected weather conditions’ can be a ‘significant’ risk for agriculture, and 
that the growing season in Russia is relatively short. (Black Earth Farming 2007, 17; Trigon Agri 
2007, 15; Alpcot Agro 2009a, p.11) However, these statements are general, formulaic and/or 
obvious in nature. They do not reference specific weather trends in Russia and Ukraine, and 
occupy only a small portion – one paragraph – of a risk disclosure statement that runs from 10 to 
15 pages, and that focuses more on the kind of legal and political risks that, as Agrokultura states 
(2009a, 16): ‘are applicable to any investment in Russia and are not specific to a certain 
investment’. Also, the general warning on weather-related risk in Trigon Agri’s case should be 
set against later statements in the same document that ‘the Black Earth region is less susceptible 
to extreme weather conditions’ (Trigon Agri 2007, 30) than Germany, France and the U.S. and 
that the Black Earth region has ‘predictable climatic conditions’ (Ibid, 32).13 
                                                          
12 Others expressed themselves more carefully.The first Chairman of the Board of BEF, Per Brilioth, is quoted in 
Lindstedt (2008, 180) as saying the following: ‘Orlov’s [founder of BEF] project was so appealing because I saw so 
many parallels with the investments we already had made in Russia in oil and gas. Agricultural land in Russia could 
be as good an investment as raw materials. But because we hadn’t invested in agriculture earlier we had respect for 
the fact that we are getting ourselves into a new line of business’. 
13 In terms of the entire prospectus, BEF does make more frequent mention than the other two companies of the 
impact weather has on yield, while still not going into detail about local, Russian weather patterns and historical 
volatility. 
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This general risk presented by weather would be dealt with by weather hedging, which is the 
geographic dispersion of land holdings such that poor weather in one area can be offset by more 
favourable weather on holdings elsewhere. Again, this is generally a recommended strategy 
among farmland investors (see TIAA-CREF 2013b, 6, 8), and an explicit strategy in the early 
years for Agrokultura (see for  example Agrimoney.com 2011b) and Trigon Agri  (See for 
example Trigon Agri 2011b, p.7). Weather-hedging is such an established ‘best-practice’ in the 
sector that Mryia Agroholding, a Ukrainian company, actually saw their credit rating 
downgraded by Fitch because their concentrated land holdings in Western Ukraine did not reflect 
an attempt to mitigate their weather risk (Roswadowski 2014).   
 
Similarly, there was little or no reference to the Soviet experience of agriculture in corporate 
documents or statements to the press. Instead, emphasis was on the fact that many of the fields 
these companies took over were abandoned or ‘fallow’ (Sjölund 2007; Alpcot Agro 2008a, 3; 
Black Earth Farming 2008, 15) – which of course is true – and also that the region’s black earth 
soils are, as oft-repeated in corporate literature and in the media: ‘the most fertile in the world’ 
(Hammar 2008; Lundin 2008; Black Earth Farming 2008, 12). There was a sense that, as 
expressed in the New York Times, ‘Russia has millions of acres of untouched, pristine land that 
could be used for agriculture’ (Kramer 2008). In other words, post-Soviet farmland was a tabula 
rasa waiting for investment, and the main risks were of a political nature.  
 
In the few references to Soviet agriculture to be found in public statements and the corporate 
literature, poor Soviet agricultural performance is ascribed to, as Agrokultura (then Alpcot Agro) 
states: ‘mismanagement’ and ‘neglect’ (Alpcot Agro 2009a, 4). Vostok Nafta, a major owner of 
BEF, commented to the media ‘that 70 years of neglect (vanskötsel) and unprofitable agricultural 
operations have led to a situation where fields are uncultivated’ (Sjölund 2007). The post-Soviet 
problems of agriculture are similarly ascribed to poor management and neglect (Janson and 
Schäring 2008), and also a lack of working capital (Trigon Agri 2007, 37) – issues which the 
Nordic agroholdings would address with ‘modern techniques’ (Sjölund 2007), western inputs, 
and capital raised on financial markets. The message here is clear: the Nordic agroholdings have 
nothing to learn from Soviet and post-Soviet agriculture experience.  
 
The emphasis on Western inputs and know-how, however, while also standard boiler-plate 
language, is important because it is this that marks the discursive and material difference with the 
Soviet and post-Soviet farms that the companies try to reinforce. This strategy would, it was 
initially promised, ensure a significant yield increase compared to Soviet and post-Soviet 
averages. BEF is quoted as stating that they would deliver yield increases of 200% (Lindstedt 
2008, 226, Lundin 2008) and even 300% (Lindstedt 2008, 181). In terms of winter wheat – 
where the local Russian average at the time was 2 to 2.5 tons per ha – this yield projection would 
amount to 5 tons per ha.  The yield improvement projection was important to the asset play 
strategy. As BEF stated: ‘This [yield improvement] is going to become the determinant factor in 
determining land prices and the main vector in creating value for our shareholders’ (Black Earth 
Farming 2008, 15).  
 
Trigon projected similar increases in yields from local averages (Trigon Agri 2009, 20), stating 
that, after three years under Trigon management, wheat yield in their Ukrainian clusters would 
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average 7 tons per ha and 6.3 tons per ha in their Russian clusters. In the business press, the yield 
improvement promises could be connected to unconsidered comparisons with Western and 
Northern Europe, as in this quote below from a Swedish business journalist:  
 
‘The land, which has been mismanaged for decades, is actually the most fertile in Europe. 
But the long-term mismanagement means the soil is a long way from its glory days. 
There are for example many farms in Skåne [Sweden’s premier farming region in the 
south of the country] that yield almost 10 times more wheat per hectare then what the 
Russian land has been yielding over the last years. You notice this, on the other hand, 
with respect to prices. One hectare of land costs today around 500-600 USD. In Poland, 
land costs for example around ten times more. In Skåne the prises are even higher.’ 
(Isacson 2007) 
 
While all the publicly traded companies posted record yields for winter wheat during the summer 
of 2014 (see Figures 4 and 5), these yields are still not up to initially promised levels. Also, the 
Nordic Agroholdings’ yields do not vary significantly from regional yields. While an 
improvement trend may be visible over the last two years, it is still too early to make conclusive 
statements in this regard, as the recent improvements are partly caused by favourable weather.14  
 
Figures 4 and 5 around here 
Figure 4: Winter Wheat and Sunflower Yields for BEF and Agrokultura compared with regional averages. The 
regional averages are the unweighted, averaged yield for farm enterprises from Voronezh, Lipetsk, Tambov and 
Kursk (Rosstat 2015) – the four oblasts where BEF has been consistently (Black Earth Farming 2015, 2014a, 2013, 
2012a, 2011a, 2010, 2009, 2008), and where Agrokultura has been concentrated, with the exception of Kaliningrad, 
since 2011-2012 (Agrokultura 2015, 2014; Alpcot Agro 2013). Note that Agrokultura reported yield results from 
Kaliningrad separately, i.e. the figures shown in Figure 4 come from their operation in the central black earth 
district. With respect to both companies, net yields – after storage and other losses – are reported. BEF in their Third 
Quarter Report in 2014 (Black Earth Farming 2014b, 2) stated that their yields for spring crops, including winter 
wheat, were ‘significantly higher’ than regional yields. Figure 4 appears to contradict this statement, though there 
can be several valid reasons for this discrepancy. It should further be noted that these companies are two of the 
largest farm companies in these four oblasts and would therefore constitute a portion of the regional averages. The 
purpose of this and the following figure is to put initial yield projections in context. These figures have only limited 
use as a benchmark of agricultural performance because they contain no information on cost per hectare.  
 
Figure 5: Comparison of Trigon Yield in Kharkiv with Regional Averages in Kharkiv. Note that in contrast to 
Russian statistics, Ukrainian regional averages for wheat yield include spring wheat yield, which will pull down the 
average somewhat in relation to Trigon’s figures, which are just winter wheat yield. Yield information comes from 
Trigon Agri Annual Reports (2015, 2014, 2013a, 2012, 2011b, 2010a, 2009, 2008). The source for Kharkiv regional 
wheat yields are State Statistical Services of Ukraine (2014). 
 
Lessons Learned: Changing expectations and practice 
The promised yield improvements and financial returns have been, to say the least, 
disappointing. In light of this, the three publicly traded companies have adjusted their 
                                                          
14 Favorable weather in the spring and early summer of 2014 was definitely a factor in pushing up 2014’s early crop 
yields. As there have been a slew of warnings concerning the condition of winter wheat in Russia going into 2015 
(see Agrokultura 2014b; Agrimoney.com 2014b; United States Department of Agriculture 2014; Agrimoney.com 
2014c). further progress on improving wheat yields seems in danger. 
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expectations and instituted new practices and strategies to improve the agricultural production 
side of the business.15  
 
For example, there is more appreciation among the Nordic agroholdings for the vagaries of the 
Eurasian climate. BEF has for example tempered yield expectations: ‘...the climate means crop 
yields levels are lower than say W. Europe and the risk higher...’ (Black Earth Farming 2012a, 
6). The former BEF manager interviewed for this study, an agronomist by training, said that he 
did not think yields could increase significantly due to the climate, stating for example that when 
the humidity declines to 20% (as it can in Russia and Ukraine) wheat physically stops growing 
during the heat of the day (interview January 2014). A current high-ranking manager in BEF also 
noted a greater risk to yield in Russia, compared to North America, again due to the climate 
(interview May 2014). A current manager in Trigon Agri noted the importance of micro-climates 
for production purposes, stating ‘…I think the only way to find out… just to work in these 
regions, because that, over time, will show which the better areas are. [sic]’ (Interview July 
2014). Trigon Agri has also, in subsequent risk disclosure statements to investors (See Trigon 
Agri 2010b, 15; Trigon Agri 2011a, 28-29), revised its assessment of the weather to include a 
much more detailed description of the specific farming-related weather challenges in Russia and 
Ukraine.   
 
The three publicly traded companies are also shrinking, consolidating and geographically 
shifting their respective land bank so that, as one respondent put it: ‘the land isn’t spread out over 
half of Russia.’ (Interview with former BEF manager, January 2014). At a macro level, this new 
geography reflects primarily climatic and logistical concerns, though it also reflects a 
rationalization of some of the lower quality land inadvisably acquired during the scramble for 
land in 2006-2008.16 In terms of climate, companies have moved out of the drier production 
clusters in the east (Samara, Penza, Volgograd, Stavropol’, and Kurgan) towards areas with 
better rainfall (See Figure 6). As Agrokultura CEO Steven Pickup said: ‘ few units less sun is not 
going to bankrupt you, but getting no rain will’ (Agrimoney.com 2013b). Even BEF, which in 
contrast to Agrokultura and Trigon Agri, never sought to diversify holdings as a weather hedge, 
is re-balancing its holdings away from relatively drier Voronezh towards the northern part of its 
production area where rainfall is somewhat better.  
 
Figure 6 around here 
Figure 6: Land holdings of Nordic agroholdings 2008-2014. Sources for location of land holdings come from the 
annual reports of the companies. In some cases interviewees could give more accurate information of the location of 
production clusters within oblasts (regions). If such information was not available, the holding was positioned in the 
center of the oblast. (Black Earth Farming 2014a, 2013, 2012a, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008; Agrokultura 2014; Alpcot 
Agro 2013; 2012, 2011a, 2010a, 2009a, 2009b, 2008a; Trigon Agri 2014, 2013a, 2012, 2011, 2010a, 2009, 2008, 
2007; Grain Alliance 2014, 2013, 2012). 
The exception is Trigon Agri’s holdings in southern Ukraine and in Russia. However, both of 
these clusters have irrigation potential, and, Trigon notes that ‘if the region as a whole has decent 
weather then the farms in the south should always do well because they’re close to the export 
ports, so effectively we retain a much larger part of the price that we get for selling our crop, 
because the implicit and explicit transport costs are so much lower than they are from further 
                                                          
15 Grain Alliance AB is an exception, as they came into this process rather well advanced on the learning curve. 
16 BEF has for example divested from 27000 ha of land that they described as lower quality.  
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out’ (Trigon Agri 2013b, 11-12). Thus, the importance of getting crops to export markets in a 
timely and inexpensive manner also helps to explain the shift eastwards in the macro-geography 
of this production. Ukraine with its relatively well developed railroad network and its access to 
Black Sea ports is particularly important in this regard. As Jens Bruno from Grain Alliance stated 
to the press: ‘people talk about the black earth and that is unique. But the most important thing is 
logistics, how cheap you can get your products to the export countries’ (Blomgren 2012).  
 
The geography of production is also changing as Nordic agroholdings are consolidating for 
reasons of control and logistics, a change that is happening at a macro-level, but also at the farm 
or production cluster level. This is a process most visible in Agrokultura in Ukraine. As CEO 
Stephen Pickup rather dramatically stated at the Annual General Shareholder meeting in 2014: 
‘[Agrokultura’s] Ukrainian empire of land was impossible to control’ (Notes from Shareholder 
Meeting 2014). Pickup also stated, in a comment specifically on Agrokultura’s consolidation of 
land in Ukraine: ‘inefficiencies are the real enemy of profitability’ (Agrimoney.com 2013b). In 
other words Agrokultura’s holdings in Ukraine were so dispersed that they could not exercise 
proper oversight over operations, which is a main reason they divested from holdings in 
southern, central and north-western Ukraine (see figure 6).   
 
Oversight in large-scale farming is important for two reasons. One is related to the timeliness of 
operations. ‘Large-scale farming is just logistics’ said the former BEF manager (interview 
January 2014). Moreover, because ‘all your operations are sequentially dependent’ (interview 
with current Agrokultura manager December 2014), if one operation is late, it has a cascading 
effect on all the other operations, negatively affecting yield. Both BEF and Agrokultura in 
Ukraine have made a big, and apparently successful, push in 2014 to improve the timeliness of 
operations (Interview with current Agrokultura manager; notes from BEF General Shareholder 
Meeting 2014; see also Black Earth Farming 2014c, p.3). Without this big push on timings, 
argues the current Agrokultura manager, Agrokultura would not have been able to capitalize on 
the favourable weather (Interview December 2014). A larger point to make is that logistics and 
the fact that it has taken some companies quite some time to master the logistical part of the 
operation weakens the argument that larger farms have external economies of scale in purchasing 
inputs. There may indeed be efficiencies in purchasing inputs (Walther 2014), but those inputs 
still have to be purchased on time, and distributed to all the fields in a timely manner or the yield 
suffers, and that challenge grows as the size of the land bank grows.  
 
The most consistent lessons learned or perspective shared across the companies was that 
dispersing holdings for the purposes of weather hedging proved to be suboptimal. As the Trigon 
Agri manager interviewed for this paper said: ‘Initially when we started we thought that we 
would spread across the regions, and with that would diversify the weather issues… but the fact 
is, that when there is a drought, it could be quite large areas at the same time, but always the 
better micro-climates are struggling less than the worst microclimate areas.’ Providing a 
somewhat different perspective, the former BEF manager stated that weather-hedging tended to 
be supported in internal BEF discussions by ‘those who do not have a lot of knowledge [about 
agriculture]’ and that ‘if you’re in it for the long-term it doesn’t matter, because it will go up and 
down.’ (Interview with former BEF manager January 2014). BEF of course ultimately never 
pursued a weather hedging strategy. A manager in Grain Alliance – another company that did not 
pursue a weather hedging strategy – said that dispersed holdings are impossible to control and 
19 
 
that both he and the Grain Alliance CFO (who works as a de facto CEO) visit each field 
cultivated by the company three times a season (Interview with Grain Alliance manager 
November 2014), something that would not be possible in a dispersed holding. The current 
Agrokultura Ukraine manager similarly stressed the importance of control and visiting each field 
multiple times, and focusing on core crops to build up expertise (Interview December 2014). In 
sum, consolidation for purposes of control and logistics trumps dispersion for purposes of 
weather hedging.17 
 
Discussion: The Contradictions of Investor Led Farming 
The empirical material presented here confirms the emerging picture of financialized agriculture 
presented in the theoretical section that the leadership or heavy involvement of financial   
investors in agriculture corporations leads to a set of contradictions that actually harm the 
productive possibilities of the company. For example, it was clearly demonstrated that investors 
still to this day see investment in these companies as an ‘asset-play’, i.e. land speculation is a 
higher priority than production in the eyes of investors. This preference has contributed to the 
prioritization of land acquisitions to the extent that land banks swelled so rapidly that they were 
unmanageable, at least initially, from the perspective of production.  
A second contradiction is that between the short-termism of financial investors and the longer-
time horizon needed to make a productive agricultural company. While many investors in these 
companies, such as Vostok Nafta (Janson and Schäring 2008), Alpcot Capital Management 
(Alpcot Capital Management 2015) and Kinnevik (Brink 2013), claim to be long-term investors, 
in practice some of the principal investors have already pulled out, or announced their preference 
for pulling out of these projects. Thus, Vostok Nafta, the first major shareholder in BEF, divested 
from the company after six years, while Alpcot Capital Management, the leading original 
investor in Agrokultura, called for the company’s liquidation in 2013, seven years after the 
company’s founding (Affärsvärlden 2013). On the other hand, the founding investors of Trigon 
Agri continue, after seven years, to exercise a key role in the company. Kinnevik another early 
and major shareholder in BEF, similarly has not given any indication that they might divest soon. 
That being said, there has been speculation in the Swedish business press commenting on 
Kinnevik’s ‘patience’ and ‘over-optimism’ (Rolander 2014) with respect to BEF or posing the 
question of how long Kinnevik will retain ownership in BEF (Forsberg 2014; Jakobsson 2013). 
This chatter in the business press is itself a kind of marker of investor short-termism. Both the 
former and current manager from BEF interviewed for this study and the former manager from 
Agrokultura argued, however, that it simply takes more time than five to seven years to build up 
a successful farming company at such a scale (see also Nikitina et al 2013 and Voronina 2011). 
                                                          
17 However, weather hedging still has its adherents among competitors to the Nordic companies. Among the 
Western big agroholdings, Ekoniva is an exception with landholdings stretching from the Western most part of the 
Black Earth into Siberia. Stefan Dürr, director of the German Ekosem/Ekoniva agroholding, said in 2012 that the 
group had ‘more than offset the lower harvest in Siberia, which suffered from a severe drought, with higher crop 
yields in the important black soil region’… ‘This once again proves the benefits of the climatic diversification of our 
farmland at various locations throughout Russia.’ (Agrimoney.com 2012b). Also Agrogeneration, representing the 
most extreme case of weather-hedging, farms in Ukraine and Argentina.  
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Third, a factor driving this short-termism is the emphasis on liquid ownership in connection with 
placement on a stock exchange. The need for liquidity even drives companies not interested in 
land speculation to scale up. This paper has not examined the degree to which large-scale 
farming is more efficient or not. However, we can question the actual motivation for achieving 
large-scale production in these companies. Financial interests – in terms of making an asset-play 
or achieving liquid ownership – seem to weigh just as much, if not more, than expected 
production efficiency in the decision to scale up production.  The fact that BEF, Agrokultura and 
Trigon Agri are now ‘shrinking to victory’ (Agrimoney.com 2014a) suggests that the synergy 
between finance and large-scale agriculture was overplayed. Also, while larger farms may enjoy 
external economies of scale, inputs still have to be purchased on time and spread out onto fields 
in time or yield suffers, a challenge that some of the investigated companies did not master until 
relatively recently.  
Liquidity is in turn related to another contradiction, which is the speed, with which finance enters 
and exits a company and how this erodes cost discipline and introduces a greater element of 
overall volatility to the companies in question. The three publicly traded companies were rather 
successful in raising a large sum of money fast, but that money came into the companies before 
the internal control systems had been put in place. This is, in fact, a common concern among 
investors considering investment in young companies going public (Ernst and Young 2013, 7), 
but it is a special concern in pure-play agriculture companies that are price-takers in terms of 
selling their harvest, which means they have to be disciplined on the cost side. Speaking of 
Landkom, which Agrokultura took over, a respondent stated:  
I mean everybody had a pickup, everybody had telephones, everybody had this, 
everybody had that. Everybody had uniforms. I mean, it was just, everybody had 
everything and Landkom went out and the equipment they bought was extremely high 
priced and so there was a lot of that financial undiscipline [sic]... (interview with current 
Agrokultura manager, December 2014).  
The liquidity offered by the stock market also allows investors to flee companies with relative 
ease. This is what happened to BEF and Trigon Agri in 2008. The share price was unnaturally 
pushed up by investors seeking new outlets as the financial crisis was brewing in Europe and the 
U.S. and grain prices were shooting through the roof, and it came crashing down at the first sign 
that grain prices would start to fall (see Linstedt 2008, 388-389; see also Voronina 2008). While 
grain prices certainly affect the profitability of the companies, the stock market dynamics in 
2008 had less to do with company performance or conditions in the local market and more to do 
with investors reacting to changing global conditions. Stock market fluctuations in effect add 
another layer of volatility to an endeavor that is already volatile due to weather unpredictably 
and commodity price fluctuations. 
Even investors are starting to see a mismatch between stock markets and agriculture. There have 
been several delistings in recent years of pure-play companies, such that the 11 publicly traded 
pure-play companies active in Russia and Ukraine in 2012 (Luyt et al 2013, 53-66 and note 139) 
have now been reduced to seven. The same year that Vostok Nafta divested from BEF, the 
Lundin Family, the founders of Vostok Nafta, announced a separate investment in agriculture in 
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South America.  This time however, they indicated that they will not seek stock market financing 
(di.se 2013). There is in other words a movement away from the stock market as a source of 
capital for agricultural investments. As a former board member of Agrokultura said:  
‘one can question if these big companies as a model work or if it is better that the 
companies are run by the owner. That they shouldn’t be public, maybe they should be 
privately owned. The stock market sets horribly tough demands, and doesn’t like 
uncertainty, doesn’t like volatility and if you are a long-term private owner, I am 100% 
convinced that this [agriculture] is the right investment’. (interview with former board 
member of Agrokultura, January 2014).  
Another contradiction concerns a clash between the case made on paper for farmland 
investments in Russia and Ukraine and concrete realities encountered on the ground. The main 
elements of the case for farmland investments in Russia and Ukraine rest on so-called ‘global 
drivers’, and are still being made, as indicated in the following quote from a Swedish business 
magazine in 2013:  
‘...At the same time we know that access to grain is one of our biggest global challenges, 
a challenge that the recent extreme weather reminds us of, but which otherwise increases 
successively as the world population increases, people are living longer and getting a 
higher quality of life – all while agricultural area is decreasing. To be in Russia as Trigon 
Agri and Black Earth Farming are, where there is a large unexploited potential of earlier 
cultivated black earths, has to be right.’ (Veckans Affärer 2013).   
Thus global trends are used to promote and justify farmland investments in Russia and Ukraine. 
In building their case for investing in Russian farmlands, investors also often pointed to the 
Brazilian experience. As Luyt et al (2013, 20) put it investors believed that: ‘farmland bought for 
USD 600-800 per ha [in Russia] would, over a relatively short period, converge towards the 
prevailing Brazilian market level of around USD 3,500 per hectare’. Investors and business 
journalists as seen above also made comparative references to land prices in Europe. Finally, 
there was an assumption that the actual farming part would be relatively easy (Luyt et al 2013 
22), based on confidence in international best practice, an assumption that Soviet and post-Soviet 
agriculture suffered only from neglect, mismanagement and lack of capital, and on unconsidered 
notions of yield gaps between Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
However trends with respect to land prices in the regions of Russia have not followed global 
trends, as there has actually been an oversupply of farmland in much of Russia’s black earth belt 
(Visser 2013). Local commodity prices, while correlated with international prices in the long 
term, can  in the short term substantially deviate from global trends as well. The local climate, it 
turns out, does present serious challenges that most companies have been unable to eliminate 
with the help of weather-hedging. The local matters, in other words. The final point to make, in 
this regard, is that the case for these investments, informed as they were by ‘global drivers’, and 
the (oftentimes) unconsidered reference to benchmarks from other regions to promote these 
investments – Brazil in terms of land prices, Europe in terms of yield gaps and land prices – plus 
the fetishization of the black earths, effectively distances investors from the real conditions on 
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the ground where they are placing their money. In other words, financialization, ironically, has 
driven a distancing between investors and the farms they invest in (at least initially), just as it has 
done elsewhere between farms and consumers (Clapp 2014). 
Conclusion 
We have shown that access to finance on the one hand did indeed result in the companies being 
well capitalized, but on the other hand also resulted in a series of contradictions that harmed the 
farming side of the business. While the current conflict in the region has hampered operations for 
all the companies under investigation (with the possible exception of Grain Alliance), all of the 
problems outlined above pre-date the current conflict. Beyond the contradictions discussed 
above, this study has pointed to some broader questions that should be addressed. First, to what 
degree are the problems seen in the Nordic Agroholdings special to foreign farm investors or do 
they reflect problems among the agroholdings in general?  
Some observers might argue that the foreign companies did worse than the domestic companies, 
as the observed tendency of relying on global best practices instead of knowledge of local 
circumstances was stronger among the former. While some domestic agroholdings probably had 
an advantage in this respect, many of the domestic investors (oligarchs) also came from outside 
the agricultural sector (Visser and Spoor 2011) and had only a rudimentary knowledge of 
agriculture. Moreover, about a third of all the top 25 largest agroholdings in Russia (both 
domestic and foreign) are facing major financial difficulties (Visser, Spoor and Mamonova 
2014). Thus putting aside the foreign owned companies as atypical, would preclude getting 
insight into the wider contradictions that characterise the agroholdings, and the public ones in 
particular.   
When the Nordic companies are compared with other listed pure-play companies, the somewhat 
better performance of two of them, IMC and Agrogeneration, at first seems to contradict the 
tendencies described for the Nordic companies. However, a closer look at these companies in 
fact, shows us the centrality of the contradictions we discussed for agroholding performance. 
Thus, their presence in Ukraine, with its moratorium on agricultural land sales, precludes an 
asset-play strategy, and both companies have expanded at a measured pace.18 As Luyt et al 
(2013, 63) state, speaking specifically of IMC and delisted Continental Farmer’s Group: ‘[the 
successful companies] achieved operational efficiency in a single cluster before ramping up 
operations to a larger scale’. These same arguments also apply to unlisted, but more profitable 
Grain Alliance, which is also exclusively in Ukraine, has expanded at a measured pace and has 
all local management. The regulatory context, thus seems to have imposed important constraints 
on the speculatory tendencies that being listed otherwise entails. 
Second, a question that deserves further study is the notion of ‘international best practice 
agronomy’. The problem is not that the agronomists employed by the Nordic agroholdings were 
not sufficiently talented. The agronomists and indeed the managers among our respondents gave 
                                                          
18 Agrogeneretion had 40,000 ha of land in Ukraine upon being listed on the Paris Stock Exchange, and expanded to 
around 51,000 ha whereupon they merged with Harmelia in 2013, resulting in a total landbank (in Ukraine) of  
120,000 ha. Agrogeneration had a string of profitable years from 2010 to 2012, but then with the rest of the sector 
suffered losses in 2013.  
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the impression of being highly knowledgeable and capable professionals. The problem is rather 
how investors relate to ‘best practice  agronomy’ and their naïve belief that it can be deployed all 
over the world, replacing previously ‘unmodern’ or ‘ineffective’ methods, with relatively fast 
positive effects on agricultural productivity. In other words, the notion of ‘international best 
practice’ agronomy and its universal applicability should be unpacked and problematized (Scott 
1998).  
Third, beyond the mixed role of finance, is it the stock market in particular that is a problem for 
agricultural companies? This study indicates that this is indeed the case, as the stock market 
appears to be a platform for short-term investors, whose interest in agriculture is restricted 
mostly to the land and not to production. However, this conclusion is based on an analysis of a 
handful of companies, and further study of the broader population of public agricultural 
companies (including vertically integrated companies) in the former Soviet Union and in South 
and North America would be warranted.  
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